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Throughout the last 2500 years, the classification of individual differences in
healthy people and their extreme expressions inmental disorders has remained
one of the most difficult challenges in science that affects our ability to explore
individuals’ functioning, underlying psychobiological processes and pathways
of development. To facilitate analyses of the principles required for studying
individual differences, this theme issue brought together prominent scholars
from diverse backgrounds of which many bring unique combinations
of cross-disciplinary experiences and perspectives that help establish connec-
tions and promote exchange across disciplines. This final paper presents
brief commentaries of some of our authors and further scholars exchanging
perspectives and reflecting on the contributions of this theme issue.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Diverse perspectives on diversity:
multi-disciplinary approaches to taxonomies of individual differences’.
1. Introduction
To taxonomize individual differences, psychologists have invested considerable
efforts over the last century. Allport &Odbert [1] scannedmore than half amillion
entries in the English dictionary to filter out 17 953 person-descriptors that formed
the basis of numerous lexical models (e.g. Big-Five Model, Hexaco Model and
Big Seven Model). Modern studies compete over the largest numbers of cultures
studied or participants involved, with some reaching millions [2,3]. But these
studies, focused on amassing data, cannot advance our understanding of the
underlying psychobiological systems and the processes of individuals’ normative
and pathological functioning and development. In fact, such mass investigations
of a broad range of differential dimensions are possible only by capitalizing on the
efficiency of language-based tools such as standardized questionnaires that
capture people’s beliefs and therefore enable investigators to collect their data
online and thus remote from their participants [4–7].
These approaches, although still popular in psychology, have clearlymet their
limits. Claims that the psychometrically derived Five Factor Model (FFM) reflects
a universal structure of individual differences [3] could not be substantiated;
no reliable and specific neurophysiological correlates were found, and multiple
neurophysiological systems of individual differences reported in the neuro-
sciences were not incorporated [8]. Scholars from various fields, including some
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language-basedmodels andmethods, anddemand to intensify
the study of physiology and behaviour [5,6,9]. Classifying indi-
vidual differences is a fundamental and non-trivial task that
cannot be solved by a single discipline or single methodology.
In this theme issue, we therefore invited contributions from
scholars from diverse backgrounds, involving prominent
scholars from different scientific disciplines and with unique
combinations of multi-disciplinary experience, who are work-
ing in different countries and at different research centres, and
who have established different multidimensional taxonomic
models of individual differences using different methodo-
logical approaches and different methods of investigation.
This diversity in perspectives is reflected in our contributions.
Topromote exchangeand to facilitate integrationof insights,
this final contribution presents brief mutual commentaries of
some authors of the issue as well as of some further scholars.
Their reflections about the theme issue are organized around
basic themes discussed: principles of taxonomy development,
the neurophysiology of temperamental traits, developmental
perspectives aswell as discussions of functional differentiations
and physiological underpinnings of specific traits.2. Reflections on: principles of taxonomy
development
(a) Linearity of temperament dimensions
Those papers of the theme issue focusing onways of taxonomy
formation and basic concepts of measurement [10–14] mostly
emphasized nonlinearity instead of linear traits, and patterns
of phenomena instead of single dimensions required for
measurement and taxonomy of temperament. Some of them
seem to represent controversial positions like: formation of con-
cepts as a first step and deriving experiments, which fit the
model thereafter [10,12], as opposed to others deriving their
taxonomies from a data-driven approach [11]. I would like to
point out that these approaches are compatiblewhen analysing
the basic meanings represented by the term linearity and
temperament traits.
We must be aware that any psychological phenomenon,
even if defined by a qualitatively distinct separate functional
entity (like attention or perception), never represent items of
yes/no alternatives, when observed or measured, but can
always be conceived as ‘more or less’, ‘larger or smaller’,
i.e. a dimension. So dimensionality is inherent in any single
observation of a certain function.
Therefore, as soon as we wish to infer rules or laws or any
type of generality, we usually combine counts or measures
within individuals in order to generate broader sets of obser-
vations into a common measure (scales or sets of measures)
in order to generalize them to other individuals. This is inevi-
table if theoretically developed taxonomy systems are
translated into experimental proof, and this is the basis of
empirical validation of traits, which can usually not dowithout
either a priori assumptions or correlations between items or
single observations of behaviour.
So a certain type of linearity is inherent in everyobservation
of a psychological or physiological variable. This requires a
definition of what we mean by nonlinearity. Nonlinearity can
only be defined either on the dimension of (i) time or/and
(ii) intensity (size of steps being unequal and perhaps includingfurther qualities like shape of change, number, frequency and
size of fluctuations) or (iii) according to its dependence on
one or more simultaneously considered variables. The latter
can be the case by (a) unidimensional causal relations or by
(b) single stimulus-response influences like in a first step of
feedback or (c) by modification of the relationship between
two variables A and B by one or multiple variables C to X.
The latter approach is taken by analysing intra-individual
patterns, as favoured by Cloninger & Zwir [11], which can be
statistically tested by non-parametric methods like configural
frequency analysis [15] or log-linear models based on Bayesian
concepts. It must be emphasized that the term ‘pattern’ in this
approach does notmean that a group characterized bya certain
temperament trait (defined by some psychological tool) differs
from another group bya set of physiologicalmeasuresA, B and
C,but rather that intra-individual constellationsofhighand low
expressions of certain variables identify a certain individual
and that individuals with the same constellations might form
a group. This means that the high or low expression of variable
A is the conditionof adifferent relationshipbetweenvariables B
and C in the low and high condition of A. This can be extended
to higher-order conditional interactions, which can form the
basis of intra-individual pattern analysis and can be applied
also to temporal relationships. (Variable A at time 1 may
mean a positive relation between variables B and C, and at
time 2 no or a negative relationship between B and C [16], an
approach relevant to developmental analyses; see [17].)
So it seems that both approaches—the one guided by top-
down theory and the one using the bottom-up data-driven
approach—emphasize nonlinearity and mutual influences
between variables relevant to temperament, but just attack
the problem from two different ends.
Perhaps future research can identify new basic tempera-
ment dimensions defined by the extent to which behaviour
and biochemical or physiological variables are coupled and
uncoupled across time and/or within an individual, and
the regularity and fluctuation of these coupling processes
similar to connectivity measures in functional magnetic
resonance analysis.
Petra Netter
(b) Analysing the working principles of biological
systems: irrelevance of independent dimensions
We should shape our taxonomies of psychiatric disorders and
biologically based traits (temperament) in normal popu-
lations on the basis of a separation of regulatory systems as
have been found in neurophysiology rather than of public
opinions or statistics. In addition to neurophysiology studies,
I spent all of my career working psychometrically on many
questionnaires, and I do not object to using these methods.
However, our psychometric obsession with independence
of dimensions is irrelevant when we analyse working prin-
ciples of biological (highly integrated) systems, and not
properties of our instruments. For example, systems of habit-
ual and novel behaviour work in tandem, passing control
over behaviour to each other, depending on situational chal-
lenges. Therefore, they are not at all independent in action,
but yet they have a well-identified neuroanatomical and func-
tional specificity. I hope that future investigations will pay
attention to functional, neurophysiologically based and not
to statistical models of taxonomies.
Vladimir Rusalov
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understanding psychobiological underpinnings of
individual differences
Themost popularmodels of human individual differenceswere
developed on the basis of human everyday language; this
applies to lexical approaches where the person-descriptive
words in the lexica are used as starting points for investigations
as well as to models developed on the basis of questionnaire
responses in which lay people indicate their subjective judge-
ments of a target individual. The efficiency by which
questionnaires enable big datasets to be collected about broad
domains of individual differences has boosted the development
of statisticalmethods in psychologyand has shifted researchers’
focus to psychometric theories and methods, away from the
individuals under study. But by selecting only those variables
that fit particular statistical assumptions and discarding all
those that do not fit—as is standard practice in psychometric
instrument development—researchers radically adapt the
phenomena under study to the research methods rather
than vice versa. Such approaches result in straightforwardly
structured models that are rather easy to interpret—also
because their origins in people’s subjective judgements entail
a guaranteed match with our everyday beliefs [4–7].
The contributions of this theme issue have impressively
shown that language-based approaches are not only a
coarse way of taxonomizing the diversity that people per-
ceive among individuals, but are essentially misleading
research in several ways.(1) Studying individuals’ beliefs and ideas as encoded in
everyday language may be insightful about human
socio-cognitive, cultural and linguistic abilities but
cannot reveal anything about psychobiological processes.
Our belief systems and everyday languages have evolved
to provide orientation and to facilitate navigation in our
highly complex social world—and not to adequately
reflect the intricacies of the highly complex biological sys-
tems of our bodies and brains [18,19]. Language is no
valid starting point for taxonomizing the psychobiological
underpinnings of perceivable individual differences.
(2) The exploration of psychobiological systems requires fun-
damentally different approaches and methods enabling
the study of (brain) morphology, physiology, behaviour
and ongoing psychical processes—rather than of just
people’s judgements and belief systems as in assessment
methods [7,9].
(3) The statistical methods most widely used in differential
psychology (e.g. Factor Analysis and Structural Equation
Modelling) are linear methods that facilitate the identifi-
cation of structures underlying sets of redundant lexical
variables. But such methods are inadequate for analysing
the nonlinear relationships found in most psychological
and physiological processes in which redundancy rarely
occurs [12,20–22]. Instead, statistical methods are needed
that enable the identification of fluid processes that interact
with one another in a contingent, nonlinear, multi-level
and feedback manner that still presents profound
challenges for their mathematical formalization [8,10,13].
(4) Finally, language-based methods mislead participants
and researchers alike in the understanding and interpret-
ation of the kinds of phenomena that can actually becaptured in empirical studies. Our abilities to denote
even complex and abstract ideas with single words
often mislead us to assume that these complex phenom-
ena constitute real entities (e.g. ‘traits’) that could thus be
measured rather directly. The present contributions high-
lighted the necessity to develop far more sophisticated
models, approaches and methods for studying individual
differences than are currently applied in psychology.
Jana Uher
(d) Conceptual principles for ‘spectral analysis’ of
interacting composites
I share the opinions of Cloninger & Zwir [11], Robbins [23] and
Rusalov [13] that the principles of our classifications should go
beyond the Lego-language of independent ‘building blocks’—
‘basic kinds’ of emotions and ‘basic unitary constructs’ of
traits—as major units of analysis. Diversity, the subject of taxo-
nomies, relates to distributions of types, and the most
commonly analysed distributions in psychology are Gaussian
normal distributions, defined by its author as the result of
actions of multiple random factors. As Gauss [24] pointed out,
the more these factors (errors or deviations) are contributing
to the distribution, the more stable and well-identified is the
mean, and this is important to remember when talking about
the most consistent traits. Traits are always non-unitary
phenomena. They are the result of holographic interactions
between environmental factors and individual capacities
(as pointed out in [11,20–22]). If we want to progress in our
taxonomies, we need to discuss conceptual principles for a
‘spectral analysis’ of these interacting composites with a closer
look at the entanglement of components (similar to the analysis
of the interaction of inseparable quarks in elementary particle
physics). The degree of interaction or intercorrelations should
not be, therefore, a grouping principle of our taxonomies as it
is not very informative. A consensus on the criteria for ‘spectral
analysis’ of neurophysiology of temperament traits is still to be
reached, andourFETmodeloffers one suchprinciple: functional
architecture of construction and regulation of behaviour.
Irina Trofimova
(e) Integrative taxonomies of temperamental
differences and mental disorders
Distinguishing those aspects of behaviour that have a pre-
dominantly biological basis (temperament) from those that are
apparent in socio-cultural interactions (personality) is important
inpsychological andpsychiatricpractices.As apsychiatrist, I am
often faced with the task of evaluating clients within what Tro-
fimova [10] has called the ‘grey area’ between normal function
and mental illness. Some people may be transitioning from a
state of illness back tonormalityor be in theprocess of becoming
ill, and the capacities of some peoplemay be so exceptional that
theywouldnot fit intoour traditionalviewofnormality. Finding
correspondencesbetween taxonomiesofmental illness and tem-
perament profiles of normative behaviour may facilitate a more
structured approach to such transitional states and/or excep-
tional traits. Many authors in this volume showed that the
following temperament traits have a biological basis, even
though they were not highlighted as major dimensions in per-
sonality: physical endurance, motor retardation or high speed
of actions, rigidity–plasticity of behaviour, impulsivity, risk-
sensation seeking tendencies, sustained attention or effortful
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probabilistic thinking, emotional dispositions and sensory
processing sensitivity [10,17,20–23,25–30].
For me, as a clinician, it is intriguing to observe the strong
convergence between the lists of traits identified in tempera-
ment research and the lists of symptoms of mental disorders
as identified in the DSM/ICD (when these traits are expressed
in extreme, pathological form; [17,21,23,26,29–33]). This corre-
spondence is promising for the development of taxonomies
that would cover the continuum between the ideal of ‘normal-
ity’ and mental illness, and, which would be useful for studies
in psychopharmacology, psychiatry, neurochemistry and
psychophysiology. Moreover, in my psycho-pharmacological
practice, I have observed that clinical symptoms similar to
these temperament traits can be adjusted by usingmedications,
in line with the view that these traits in healthy people and the
corresponding symptoms in psychiatric patients share a
common neurochemical aetiology. By contrast, the majority of
personality disorders fail to respond to pharmacological inter-
ventions. Therefore, I see a great need to distinguish between
the concepts of temperament and personality, because the
concept of temperament has a better capacity to discriminate
features that are crucially monitored in our treatment and
counselling practices than the concept of personality.
William Sulis3. Reflections on: neurophysiology of
temperament traits
Plasticity of behaviour, a temperament trait identified over 100
years ago in the Eastern-European experimental tradition of
studying temperament, was proved to possess electrophysio-
logical, neuroanatomical correlates and, as Robbins’ [23] and
Trofimova’s [10] reviews pointed out, neurochemical correlates.
Similarly, neurophysiological correlates were found for the
temperament traits of intellectual ergonicity/endurance (or
effortful control, as per [20]), physical ergonicity/endurance,
motor tempo, empathy, verbal capacities and neuroticism—
all were proved to be regulated by specific neurophysiological
systems. Moreover, our activity-specific models (STQ, [34,35]
and FET, [36,37]), unlike other models, used differentiation
between traits regulating habitual, well-learned elements of
behaviour and novel elements. After all, neurophysiologists
have known for decades that the first types of elements are regu-
lated primarily by the striatum and the construction of novel
elements requires more involvement of frontal cortex. Yet,
these temperament traits, which we separated in our models
according to neurophysiological studies of intra-individual
stability and inter-individual differences, are not within the
radar of genetic, longitudinal and neurochemical studies,
which use primarily personality questionnaires.
Vladimir Rusalov
In terms of the neurophysiology of temperament traits, pio-
neers usually walk in darkness and undertake a first set of trials
and errors that we all benefit from later. I would only praise the
authors of the early neurotransmitter hypotheses of tempera-
ment for their bravery, even though our own (FET) model
[36,37] might be different from them. The results, which were
reported in this volume, support the FET suggestion that the
functional role of MA systems is probably not in the regulation
of emotionality (considering the inconsistency of the associ-
ations of MA with neuroticism and reward-dependence)[22,25]. This important negative result is worth exploring. The
FET model highlights findings in neurochemistry, suggesting
that DA systems prioritize and update behavioural pro-
grammes, whereas 5-HT maintains the available alternatives.
In fact, Netter’s [25] studies of the reaction time (i.e. timing of
integration of actions) reported a slow-down universally in
both extra- and introverts when a DA antagonist is used.
Moreover, when only DA (and not 5-HT) systems were
compromised in experiments of Robbins [23], Netter [25] and
Dellu-Hagedorn et al. [26], an individual could not prioritize be-
havioural alternatives into situation-adequate actions, but still
was able to maintain previous sets of programmes; this results
in rigidity and perseveration around the same acts. When a
deficiency in 5-HT was added to disturbances in DA release,
a low turn-over of the DA led to high impulsivity [23,26].
This is interpreted by the FET as compromised maintenance
of the established behavioural alternatives: without a proper
functioning cortical 5-HT system, an individual cannot main-
tain internally established/selected behavioural programmes,
and so ismore susceptible to building programmes using exter-
nal stimuli and distractions. Combined with problems in the
DA systems that lead to inadequate (for the situation) timing
of behavioural acts, this results in behavioural impulsivity. I
believe that the following links should be explored in future
studies to clear this picture: effects of 5-HT systems in endur-
ance of behaviour, NE-regulated systems in behavioural
sensitivity and orientation (such as sensation seeking, empathy
and probabilistic thinking) and associations between opioid
receptors and temperamental emotional dispositions.
Irina Trofimova
(a) Understanding the function of brain regions and
networks with multidimensional representations
The general issue of structure–function mapping is central to
the understanding of the mind–brain relations, and this, in
turn, determines how psychological taxonomies of biologically
based traits can be partitioned on the basis of our understand-
ing of neurophysiological systems. In the past decade, I have
developed an approach to characterizing the relationship
between emotion and cognition [38] that largely resonates
with the framework described by Trofimova [10]. One of the
central questions addressed is the following: Are there special-
ized circuits in the brain for emotion? In an important sense,
the answer is ‘no’ because the very boundary between emotion
and the ‘rest of the brain’ is ill-defined. Because brain regions
are involved inmultiple functions, and functions can be instan-
tiated by multiple regions, investigators are faced with a
challenging many-to-many problem [39]. In previous work,
we proposed to characterize the function of brain regions via
functional fingerprints [40,41], namely amultidimensional rep-
resentation based on a relatively small set of mental ‘domains’.
The functional ‘fingerprint’ for a given region represents both
the set of domains that systematically engage the region and
the relative degree of engagement (figure 1a). Beyond the
descriptive aspects of the approach, it outlines a framework
in which a region’s function is viewed as inherently multi-
dimensional: a vector defines the fingerprint of a region in
the context of a specific domain structure. How should one
define the domain structure? One hope is that cognitive ontol-
ogies can be defined that meaningfully carve the ‘mental’ into
stable categories [42,43]. However, no single ontology is likely
to be sufficient. Instead, it is better to conceive of several task
brain region
Di Di
Dl Dj
Dh
Dl Dj
Dh
brain network/circuit
task domains D:
— attention
— language
— working memory
— long-term memory
— reasoning
— sadness
— happiness
— fear
— disgust
— anger
(b)(a)
Figure 1. Multidimensional fingerprints characterize the functional repertoire
of brain regions and networks/circuits. (a) The polar plot illustrates the fin-
gerprint of a particular brain region, with each vertex corresponding to the
degree of involvement in a mental task domain D (example domains shown
on the right). (b) The same idea can be extended to describe the functional
repertoire of brain networks/circuits. (Online version in colour.)
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brain function and/or behaviour. Thus, a region’s functional
fingerprint needs to be understood in terms of a family of
(possibly related) domains. In the past decade, the field has
witnessed a progressive shift to describing mental function in
terms of brain networks. Does a description of structure–func-
tion relationships in terms of networks allow for a one-to-one
mapping? For instance, a network comprised regions R1, . . . ,
Rn is involved in function F (such as ‘executive function’). I
suggest that the attempt to map structure to function in a
one-to-one manner in terms of networks will be fraught with
similar difficulties as the one based on brain regions; the pro-
blem is largely passed along to a higher level. Thus, the idea
of multidimensional profiles can be profitably extended to
networks (figure 1b; [40]).
There are multiple reasons for this complexity even at the
network level, including the fact that brain networks are not
disjoint but overlapping (specific brain regions participate in
multiple brain networks [44]) and dynamic (a region’s network
affiliation evolves in time; [45]). These considerations also imply
that, neuroanatomically, there are no specific brain networks for
traits of positive or negative emotionality, or neuroticism/extra-
version. The ideas above are closely aligned with several
principles outlined by Trofimova [10], including functional
and physical overlap, and dynamics. A deeper understanding
of complex relationship between mind and brain will benefit
from frameworks that embrace these types of principles.
Luiz Pessoa
(b) Neurotransmitter systems and brain areas
Many papers of the theme issue converge on opinion that
different neurotransmitter systemswork differently in different
brain areas, responding only to specific tasks, in line with the
activity-specific approach offered by Rusalov [13] (i.e. propos-
ing to separate traits related to physical, verbal and mental
aspects of behaviour) and also shows that we better tune our
taxonomies to the classifications of tasks. For example, in
drug challenges reported by Netter [25], people with cognitive
impulsivity had more noticeable DA-PRL and NE-cortisol
changes than people with high motor impulsivity. The FET
suggests that neuropeptides, as a class, play a much stronger
role in ‘motor-physical’ traits, whereas frontal–cortical mono-
amine systems play a stronger role in ‘cognitive traits’, and so
frontal MA manipulations will affect cognitive functionsmore thanmotor regulation of behaviour.Moreover, the differ-
ences in functionality of cortical and basal ganglia regions in
the regulation of probabilistic (complex, novel) or more deter-
ministic aspects of behaviour (habits, automatic actions) are
rarely discussed, but, as Dellu-Hagedorn et al.’s [26], Robbins’
[23] and Rusalov’s [13] papers suggest, these differences are
crucial in understanding the sources of inconsistencies in
neurochemical and neurophysiological studies of psychologi-
cal traits. I agree with Rusalov [13] that Bernstein’s [46]
classic notion of passing control over the construction of behav-
iour between several levels of automaticity is often overlooked
but should be implemented in taxonomies of psychological
traits and mental disorders.
Irina Trofimova4. Reflections on: developmental perspectives
(a) Development of neural networks
As Hoyniak et al. [28] suggested in their interesting paper, the
frontal N2 component provides onewindow on the neural sys-
tems of effortful control. The development of effortful control
begins at least by seven months, when infants look longer at
an error in simple visual problems [47], showing increases in
the error-related N2 occur over the same electrode sites
shown in adults to involve the anterior cingulate gyrus [48].
However, as Hoyniak et al. [28] suggested, even though infants
can note errors at sevenmonths, they do not act on them by, for
example, slowing their next response until 30–48 months, a
time when the executive attention network shows increasing
connectivity as shown by resting state MRI. Moreover, we
can use specific training methods to enhance N2 by improving
responses to conflict [49]. Bringing together questionnaires,
observational and behavioural data, such as reaction time
with neuroimaging, can greatly enhance our understanding
of the role of effortful control in development [50].
Michael I. Posner and Mary K. Rothbart
(b) Using known brain networks to choose
candidate genes
Sallis et al. [51] say that heritability estimates rest in part on the
assumption that gene by environment (GXE) interactions are
weak. However, in agreement with a general developmental
approach to temperament, there are GXE interactions between
effortful control and parenting and with interventions that
involve parent training (for a review, see [52]). As the authors
pointed out, candidate gene studies have often not been replic-
able. However, by choosing candidate genes on the basis of
knowledge of brain networks related to effortful control, repli-
cationmay be improved aswell as the centrality of the network
approach supported by the resulting genetic data [52].
Michael I. Posner and Mary K. Rothbart
(c) Temperament: a complex but useful concept for
understanding the development of psychopathology
Temperament, as with many other psychological concepts, is a
complex construct as it is not unitary and does not exist as a
concrete entity in nature. Yet, it is a useful and important con-
struct that has shown associations with biological and
neurochemical regulatory systems. Temperament is defined
here as individual differences in reactivity to the environment
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and relatively stable. Temperamental individual differences,
especially in interaction with the environment, are useful
for understanding processes of risk and resilience in the
development of psychopathology.
A number of the contributions in this theme issue are con-
sistent with the National Institute of Mental Health’s Research
Domain Criteria (RDoC), which seek to understand the devel-
opment of underlying phenotypes of psychopathology across
multiple developmental stages and at multiple levels of analy-
sis, including genetic and neurodevelopmental pathways
[12,21,53]. Farde et al. [22] described the benefits of examining
the biological underpinnings of dimensional traits rather than
categorical psychological disorders. Hoyniak et al. [28] exam-
ined neural correlates of temperamental inhibitory control in
toddlers, observing that larger N2 event-related potential
amplitudes in a go/no-go task are associated with poorer
inhibitory control. Posner & Rothbart [20] reviewed the
neural processes supporting attention, and described evidence
that executive attention is related to temperamental effortful
control. Kagan [17] reviewed the biological underpinnings of
behavioural inhibition (high fearfulness and reactivity), includ-
ing high amygdala activation to novelty and a high but
minimally variable resting heart rate. Robbins [23] reviewed
the contributions of various monoamine neurotransmitters to
different temperament and personality traits, and noted the
importance of considering the interactions among multiple
neurotransmitter systems, such as the interaction between
serotonin and dopamine in impulsivity, examined by Dellu-
Hagedorn et al. [26]. Cloninger & Zwir [11] discussed the
importance of considering temperament profiles, and not just
traits, when examining genetic effects. Collectively, the studies
described in this theme issue illustrate the benefit and need of
advancing our understanding of how temperament develops
across multiple levels of analysis.
Knowing how best to treat or prevent psychopathology
hinges on our ability to understand the development of psycho-
pathology atmultiple levels and acrossmultiple developmental
stages. Temperament is an important window into the early
precursors of psychopathology and provides a useful and
important avenue to advance our understanding of how psy-
chopathology develops, including why some individuals go
on to develop psychopathology in response to stress, whereas
others are resilient in the face of stress. As just one example, chil-
dren who are temperamentally high in negative emotionality
have been shown to be more sensitive to their environment,
for better and for worse [21,30,54]. Researchers have begun
to explore the genetic and biological processes accounting for
temperamental differential susceptibility to the environment.
Thus, even with its long and rich history, temperament (and
its bio-psycho-social levels) remains an important and relevant
construct even in the twenty-first century.
Isaac T. Petersen5. Reflections on specific traits: functional
differentiations and physiological
underpinnings
(a) Aggression
I think that aggression as a trait is often an overlooked subject,
perhaps because it is probably a derivative of severaltemperament traits—low empathy [25,29] (Netter indeed
reported associations with psychoticism), upregulation of inte-
grative traits (impulsivity, plasticity and tempo), dysphoric
emotional disposition, low endurance and lowered capacity
for probabilistic processing (and so rule learning). I therefore
agree with Blair [29] and those who distinguish between
several types of aggression (e.g. impulsive–impatience; well-
calculated insult; acting-out; bad mood and irritability; and
escape from inability to handle situations). This view corre-
sponds to the pattern of associations between impulsivity
and aggression with DA and 5-HT systems reported in [22,25].
Irina Trofimova(b) Attention
Posner & Rothbart’s [20] concept of NE-based ‘sensitivity and
alerting network’ is in line with the FET’s attribution of NE
systems to behavioural sensitivity, especially sensitivity to
novelty. However, it might be confusing to see very different
uses of the same word ‘orientation’ in these two models; so
let’s clarify it. Posner’s model [55] call acetylcholine-based com-
ponent of attention as ‘orienting network’ in a sense that this
network maintains orientational attention to specific stimuli.
In contrast to this, the FET model [36,37] uses the word ‘orien-
tation’ for novelty-related attention, attributed by both models
to the NE systems. Despite this difference in wording, both
models converge on the idea that ACh systems maintain
attention to established elements of situations, whereas NE sys-
tems regulate attention to novel aspects of situations as well as
many other behavioural sensitivity aspects. In fact, Posner &
Rothbart [20] themselves cited [56] study showing that antag-
onists to ACh block improvement from knowing where the
target would occur, but had no effect on RT improvement
from warning signals. Hasselmo & Stern [27] also mentioned
thewell-known role of the ACh in themaintenance of attention.
This consensus between Posner’s model and the FET model
suggests that there are neurochemical basis for differentia-
tion between orientational and attention-maintenance traits
of temperament.
Irina Trofimova(c) Understanding temperamental shyness: reflections
on heterogeneity, context and function
There are at least three long-standing issues in the personality
and behavioural sciences that are often overlooked in tempera-
ment research, but which are critical in order to move towards
a unified framework for understanding individual variation in
temperament and its predictive utility to typical and atypical
socio-emotional development. They are heterogeneity, context
and function.
Heterogeneity:Although the extant literature routinely treats
temperamental shyness as a homogeneous phenomenon, we
have long known that not all temperamentally shy children
are alike. Over six decades ago, Litwinski [57] described two
types of constitutional shyness, an active form, which he
suggested involved chronically avoiding social situations,
and a passive form, which emerged from novel situations
and the initial avoidance of these situations. Buss [58] later for-
mally described two types of shyness rooted in temperament:
an early developing fearful shyness emerging approximately
six to nine months, coinciding with the onset of stranger
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ging with self-awareness approximately 3–4 years. More
recently, others have suggested that there are positive and
negative types of shyness, with their antecedents in early
infancy [59]: positive shyness is associated with the expression
of approach-related behaviours (e.g. averting gaze, but smil-
ing), coyness and sociability, while negative shyness involves
more distress, anxiety and avoidance-related behaviours [60].
Considering heterogeneity is important because it enhances
conceptual clarity of the phenomena and also prediction.
Context: In personality science, the consideration of context
for reliably predicting behaviour has been a central theme for
decades. Lewin [61] argued that human behaviour (B) was a
function of the person’s disposition (P) and the context or situ-
ation (S), expressed as B ¼ f (P,S). However, the majority of the
work on temperament is based on assessments from limited
contexts, involving primarily mothers rating their children at
home, teachers rating children in their everyday school environ-
ments and/or observational studies of children conducted in
controlled laboratory settings. Kagan [17] accurately critiques
the limitations of maternal reports. However, laboratory
studies also have their own inherent problems, including
demand characteristics, experimenter biases, generalizability
and external validity. Does temperamental shyness generalize
to other contexts? Using a surgical setting as a non-normative
ecologically salient context, researchers recently found that tem-
peramentally shy children were consistently less anxious than
sociable children in response to impeding elective surgery
across two visits: a pre-operative visit and day of surgery [62].
Perhaps all bets are off when it comes to examining consistency
of temperament–behaviour relations in shy children in some
ecologically salient contexts, such as surgery, arguably one of
the most psychologically stressful events one can face. Examin-
ing temperamentally shy children only in traditional contexts
may limit our interpretations.
Function: What is the evolved function of the behaviour?
This is one of the four questions asked by the ethologist
and Nobel Laureate, Nikolaas Tinbergen [63] in his seminal
model, he used to understand behaviour. However, relatively
few ask this question when studying temperament (although
see [10,13,36]). What function does temperamental shyness
serve? Here, I return to positive and negative shyness. Both
types of shyness may be rooted in temperamental fear andmay have different developmental onsets and functions [64]:
negative shyness may reflect a sensitivity bias to detect threat
of physical harm by conspecifics, be subserved by evolutio-
nary old brain circuits and may have evolved to facilitate
withdrawal from danger; negative shyness probably overlaps
with Kagan’s high reactive infants [17] and Buss’ [58] fearful
shyness. Positive shyness may reflect more recent human evol-
ution and socio-cognitive processes, which may have evolved
to serve simultaneous caution arising from fear and interest,
facilitating additional time for learning to take place about con-
specifics’ motives and intentions; positive shyness has its
origins in early infancy but become crystallized in early child-
hood with cognitive maturation and probably overlaps with
Buss’ [58] self-conscious shyness and is retained in adulthood,
possibly reflecting a neotenous trait [65]. Considering the
adaptive value of temperamental phenotypes has implications
for howwe view normal behaviour and psychopathology. This
is particularly relevant inNorth American culture todaywhere
the medicalization of normal variation of some behaviours has
become routine [66].
The ideas raised by Kagan [17] and Jones & Sloan [21] in
each of their respective review papers shed new light on our
understanding of temperament, its definitional issues, origins,
correlates and outcomes, and provide fruitful avenues for
future research in this domain of inquiry. Kagan’s [17] paper
illustrates the innate temperamental bias to shyness and attests
to the value of conceptualizing temperamental variation as cat-
egories versus continua and the need to consider multiple, and
observational, measures rather than relying solely on evidence
from subjective reports. Jones & Sloan’s [21] review illustrates
the complex interactions between biology and the prenatal
environment in shaping individual differences in tempera-
ment, which raise interesting possibilities for developing
programming hypotheses of temperamental shyness.
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